The American Scene

An ongoing review of politics and culture


Things To Watch For If--And This Is a Big If--Google Buzz Catches On

1) Will bloggers start to use Buzz as a lab for post ideas, testing them out on a trusted audience before opening them up to ideological opponents, trolls and the Internet at large? At the moment, some of this function is being served by email and Twitter, but both have their limitations. Email requires you to know in advance which of your contacts might have helpful input; Twitter, obviously, makes it difficult to elaborate. I always thought this was an underutilized side function of Google Reader, my preferred Google toy, but the use of stand-alone notes hasn’t really taken off. In my limited experience, people haven’t been posting things directly to Buzz either — unless they’re about Buzz — so this would probably look more like long comment threads on tweets.

2) Will bloggers who get tired of the slings and arrows of an unruly and unilluminating commenter community retreat by posting their thoughts in Buzz?* I suspect that the bloggers most likely to do this are those a) with day jobs/other careers and/or b) who write for a specialized audience. In an extreme scenario, this could lead to a bifurcation of the blogosphere, with professional bloggers and bloggers with extremely small/negligible audiences using public platforms, and those with regular but not-overwhelming audiences on Buzz.

I don’t have any confidence that either of these would come to pass. But it would be interesting if they did!

*I know that Buzz makes it tricky for your feed to be private and your followers controlled, but it’s not impossible, and it seems to me to be the sort of thing someone with a not-huge email contact list could perform as a regular maintenance task quite easily. I won’t pretend to be an expert on the privacy issues here, and I’d rather not go into them in depth at the moment — I’ll just admit that I could easily be wrong about this and leave it at that.

Peacocking "My Way"...and Ours

This NYT story, warning that singing “My Way” in a Filipino karaoke bar will get you killed, has been making the rounds because it’s so delightfully weird. And it is! And you should read it — though the article does half-seriously dangle the possibility of a “karaoke curse” without following up, which is disappointing.

It seems to me that this sort of urban legend quickly becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If everyone knows that “My Way” is an “arrogant” choice that “covers up your failures,” as one of the article’s sources explains, and that it often leads to trouble, anyone who decides to sing it must be looking for a fight. It’s the same principle that has propelled machismo mystique from Bill Sykes to the Trouble Boys. The man who knows who (or what) rules the bar he’s stepping into, and decides to challenge him (or them, or it) anyway, must have a hell of a lot of chutzpah — and is agreed to deserve whatever is coming to him.

But by far the most fascinating passage of the article is buried in the middle, and I’m worried it might get overlooked because gender is much less fascinating than urban legends (well, to most people who aren’t me):

A subset of karaoke bars with G.R.O.’s — short for guest relations officers, a euphemism for female prostitutes — often employ gay men, who are seen as neutral, to defuse the undercurrent of tension among the male patrons. Since the gay men are not considered rivals for the women’s attention — or rivals in singing, which karaoke machines score and rank — they can use humor to forestall macho face-offs among the patrons.

I can’t shed any light on the idea that gay men are ideally situated to defuse fights between straight men, although it’s fascinating and definitely absent from American culture. (Here, “neutrality” usually casts gay men as go-betweens between men and women, or allows them to help women be more feminine. The cultural assumption, neatly deconstructed here by Phoebe Maltz, is that gay and straight men have nothing to say to each other.) Nor do I have any idea how the heck a karaoke machine can score a patron’s performance — everyone who’s ever been to a karaoke bar in the States knows it’s more about stage presence than pitch accuracy, and it’s hard to imagine how “My Way” would have this kind of baggage in the Philippines if the same weren’t true there.

But even though the article doesn’t explain how, exactly, success at taking a G.R.O. upstairs is related to karaoke prowess, it’s clear that “competing for attention” is somehow important — making karaoke, at least theoretically, a form of “peacocking”, to borrow a term from Conor’s friends in the pickup artist community. (The article doesn’t offer any clues as to whether it’s considered a good way to pick up women who aren’t prostitutes — let alone whether it works — but plenty of machismo-signaling things like this have a reputation that exceeds logic or efficacy.)

American karaoke, on the other hand, is completely desexualized: firmly in the social “friend zone.” In fact, a story in today’s Times leads with a scene of a group of girls in a Chapel Hill bar, singing along to Taylor Swift because there are no boys in sight. It’s not karaoke, but you get the point.

Furthermore, we don’t imagine men performing for women when thinking either of soliciting prostitutes or picking up chicks. In the former scenario, a man is presented with an array of women (for example, in one of the most prominent variations, during their acts at a strip club), then chooses one to go into the back room with. In the latter — which I wouldn’t be bringing into this if it weren’t disconcertingly analogous — men pick a particularly impressive woman among the dozens crowding the dancefloor (see also “Yeah” by Usher:, “Fire Burning” by Sean Kingston, or dozens of other club-jam megahits), offer to buy her a drink and chat her up as she drinks it. Women perform for men, collectively; men choose a woman and perform for her. Even pickup scripts that don’t involve dancing, like those used by pickup artists, require the man to choose his target first. And the few scenes I can think of in movies or TV shows in which karaoke is used for romantic purposes make it perfectly obvious that the performance is intended for one woman (generally a woman) alone; everyone else has suddenly become collateral, even voyeurs. There’s something refreshing in the idea of a man “putting himself out there” for any woman in the bar to assess. (I know that the sort of aggressive machismo the article describes is bad for both men and women in a lot of other ways, and I don’t mean to endorse it as a superior alternative — and, again, I have no idea how much control G.R.O.‘s actually have in determining with whom they go upstairs. I just wanted to point out this particular side effect.)

At the same time, the Filipino karaoke pickup is of a piece with the American club pickup. Men perform for women by opening their mouths; women perform for men by showing off their bodies. At least since karaoke uses someone else’s lyrics, it doesn’t pretend that a man can always rely on his superior and impressive wit, as most pickup scripts here do (though in both cases his money seals the deal). But I’d really love to see an alternative pickup script where women speak before they’re spoken — or sung — to.

This isn’t to say that it’s unheard of or frowned upon for a woman to approach a man at a bar or club, or that men’s bodies aren’t an important factor in their success with women (an absurd contention in a post- Jersey Shore world, anyway). I’m not challenging anyone to think of counterexamples — I can think of plenty! But cultural scripts aren’t about the only thing you can do, they’re about the first thing you think of, because the first thing you think of is what any alternatives are imagined and evaluated against.

White-Collar Criminals

I’ll readily admit that I get a healthy dose of schadenfreude from stories (like this one from DC and this from New York) about criminals who evade law enforcement by dressing in “professional”-looking clothing. It’s perfectly natural to judge someone based on his or her clothing — and obviously much more acceptable than doing so based on his or her skin — but in cities with pretty strict class segregation and high crime rates, it too often becomes a visual shorthand for distinguishing “regular people” (i.e. professionals) from social undesirables (potential criminals, panhandlers, etc.). The worrisome implication is that had these men not been dressed in suits, but rather in jeans and baggy shirts, they would have been eyed with suspicion even before attempting any “funny business.”

This is related to our reluctance to treat actual white-collar crime as seriously as we ought, as well, I think. As understandable as it is that we’d mix criminality into the matrix of behaviors we use to determine class, it’s not forgivable, and I don’t have a lot of sympathy for a police officer who lets a prisoner go because he assumes prisoners can’t wear suits.

Can We Avoid a Terminally Awkward Future?

Neil Sinhababu’s post here — and, even more so, the four-year-old post he links to — seems to have a lot in common with that greatly maligned Kay Hymowitz piece from last month. Which means the latter might be worth revisiting — or at least recasting in a light that doesn’t put quite so much emphasis on blaming women for “making life harder” for guys.

I think Hymowitz touched on a couple of important truths: It is manifestly true that feminism tore down a lot of the (antiquated) rules of everyday etiquette regarding romantic interaction, and failed or refused to build new ones in their place. And it is experientially true (at least as illustrated in the xkcd comic, Neil’s posts and Hymowitz’ article) that the guys this hurts are the guys who are insufficiently full of themselves to blunder on without knowing what constitutes appropriate behavior.

The question, of course, is where we go from here. I’m with Hymowitz’ critics in recognizing that there was a reason we threw out the chivalric code, and if that were our only alternative, awkwardness would be a small price to pay. But I don’t think it is the only alternative. Creating a new code of etiquette would eliminate the guessing game for nice guys and allow for the punishment of the pseudo-nice-guy brutes who emulate pickup-artist behavior because they claim it’s the only way they can get women’s attention.

A lot of liberals seem to view any social code as intentional or unintentional discrimination in disguise, which is an attitude I don’t necessarily share. But given just how lost the “nice boys” seem to be, I wish people would give just a little more consideration to creating a new, egalitarian social code, instead of assuming that awkwardness is a necessary consequence of equality. The alternative is watching variations on this xkcd strip get reused year after year, each time provoking a wistful sigh from thousands of nerds who think they’re unlucky in love but are actually just timid.

Law's Alchemy

Expanding on an argument made by various bloggers (including Noah, of course), Jack Balkin provides a really helpful lens through which to view the controversy over Sotomayor’s ruling in Ricci:

(Sotomayor’s critics) are running together two different ideas of impartiality. One principle is that judges should be impartial in interpreting the law — they should apply the law no matter what its content happens to be, regardless of who comes before them. The second idea is that the content of the law should have a certain character — it should allow for no distinctions whatsoever based on group membership or personal characteristics. But suppose the law allows for such distinctions, for example, as current law does for certain affirmative action programs. Then the first principle of impartial application of the law whatever it may be conflicts with the second principle of neutrality with respect to groups, or, in this case, colorblindness. This problem happens all the time.

So by the second definition, impartiality requires activist judging. A lot of it. But Balkin’s point also hints at why the first definition — the type of impartiality Balkin says “we normally expect” judges to demonstrate — seems odd to me as well. It portrays judges as orienteers, making their way through the American wilderness guided only by a compass pointing straight north to Constitutional ideals. But any judge outside the Supreme Court — and to a certain extent, thanks to the pressures of stare decisis, Supreme Court justices as well — are bound not just by fidelity to the Constitution (much less the principles presumed to be behind it), but to a body of statutory law and precedent. (If they weren’t, Supreme Court decisions wouldn’t matter at all.)

And the fingerprints of circumstance, of partiality, are all over this body of law. Precedent is the product of case law, the application of principle and statute to a particular set of circumstances, and honoring it often requires determining which “framework case” is most similar to the one at hand. No one who has spent any time in Washington believes that federal laws are any sort of pure expression of Constitutional principles. Even the Constitution itself exists in its current state only because of a series of compromises and negotiations. (No one who has read Catherine Drinker Bowen’s excellent book Miracle at Philadelphia could possibly mistake the Constitution for a set of tablets handed to George Washington on Mount Sinai.)

But even as we admit that the way that laws get made looks like, well, the manufacture of sausage, we expect that judges should stay unwaveringly loyal to these laws. (Any accusation of “legislating from the bench” implies that judges must remain bound by law, not principle, until instructed to do otherwise by a legislature.) We allow the people making law to represent their constituents — in fact, we generally encourage them to resemble their constituents and celebrate their own biographies — but we deny the same sort of personality to the judges who are instructed to interpret the products of politicians’ labor. Those who make law and those who apply it appear as completely different kinds of people, creating an odd divide that often makes it difficult to see the connection between the law of policy and the law of the judicial system at all. Furthermore, the double standard encourages politicians to develop larger-than-life personalities, while discouraging judges from demonstrating personality at all (see also: “pushy,” “sharp-tongued”). As Adam Serwer of the American Prospect put it on Twitter: “If there’s no place for empathy in the courtroom, why don’t we just get Google to design our new robo-judges?”

The other problem is the way the public views law itself. The notion of the “rule of law” requires some odd alchemy. At some point in the process, ugly, compromise-filled, politically contingent legislation becomes stone-encoded, immutable Law. Alternatively, a detail-filled, context-dependent case becomes a guiding light of Precedent. It makes perfect sense that the bodies responsible for performing both of these transmutations should acquire outsized significance in the public eye. The alchemists of Precedent — Supreme Court justices — are nine beneficiaries of this; the Senate is gearing up for a massive confirmation battle over a judge whose two prior federal appointments it approved without incident, and no one seems to think this is strange at all. But in order for the transformation of legislation into Law to be meaningful, extraordinary symbolic power must be given to the act of signing it into law — done, of course, by the President.

The imperial Presidency and the rule of law are often seen as antagonists, and in many cases that’s true. But the very notion that the law is greater than any human being, including those who made it and those who interpret it, requires enhancing the stature of the man at the top.

At Least Three Reasons to Care about Hipsters

tim a (among other commenters on Peter’s post from last night) asks the sort of question that deserves to be answered:

I love the seriousness of so much of this blog (including some Suderman contributions), but have no idea why any serious person (including myself) would be engaging this conversation….

We truly are at a world-historical moment that’s been building for generations. Who the hell cares who’s a “legit hipster?”

Obviously there are two questions here, the question of “Why should the hipster matter to me?” and that of “Why don’t we stick to the serious questions and ‘helpful’ analysis and skip the insidery, esoteric cultural stuff?” If you don’t think the first question is even worth asking, I urge you to skip to my answer to the second. If you don’t think the second is worth asking, check out commenter c.t.h’s spot-on answer to the first:

Read the full article

Dancin' on the Margin

Contra Peter, I think iTunes’ price tiering is blissfully intuitive.

Imagine that Apple’s practically saturated the mp3 market by this point, and therefore is depending less on new iTunes customers than new business from old customers. It’s fair to assume that shortly after joining, a customer ensured that all of his “Must-Haves” were in his iTunes library. So new acquisitions will either be a) new music; b) old music he just got turned on to or c) just-remembered rarities and impulse buys. (The radio industry calls these “oh wows.”)

I think the “ease of transaction” metric makes more sense for c) than b). (Let’s face it, a lot of b) consists of music that the customer’s Cooler Friend just turned him on to, but that the Cooler Friend, her friends, and the kind of record store she frequents have been hip to for years. So it’ll be much more readily available in the online marketplace.) But with c), customers are more likely to be dissuaded by cost than the other two categories, because the song isn’t considered a “must-have.” This is especially true in the current economy, when people like to think they’re making fiscally responsible choices even when they’re drowning in credit-card debt. Marking down the songs most likely to produce a “but I really shouldn’t spend 99 cents” reaction sounds like a really good move on iTunes’ part.

Rod Blagojevich on Humility

It strikes me, reading this liveblog of Rod Blagojevich’s stint as a guest host on a Chicago radio show last week, that the man serves up populist demagoguery of a kind they just don’t make anymore. The rhetoric is rare enough on its own: low taxes, great Leaders (Obama and Reagan come in for equal praise) and a super-personal God. But it’s the persona that really gets me. That finely-calibrated balance between martyrdom and scrappiness, punctuated with faux-humble demurrals of the “This is not Elvis” variety? That’s kickin’ it old school, man. Maybe he should stick to radio: if he can’t be Huey Long, he’s got a decent shot at Father Coughlin (minus the Fascism, of course).

It’s also touching to see that, even as he contests the legitimacy of his impeachment, Blago has had the grace to cede the trappings of elected office:

Newsman: Are those headphones going to mess up your hair?
Blago: I brought my brush.
Meteorologist: You brought “the football”?
Blago: I’m not governor anymore, it is a smaller brush.

Developments I Will Be Watching Very Closely

The Extraordinaries.

The Extraordinaries is smartphone software that allows millions of volunteers to perform tasks on their smartphones in just a few minutes…People login to our system from any place on Earth within cell reception, and constructively use small windows of spare time for science, medicine, nonprofits, government, and more.

Examples:

-Translate micro-finance loan applications (Kiva).
-Transcribe subtitles for human rights videos (Witness).
-Help immigrants improve their English (Phone ESL).
-Help NASA find craters on the surface of Mars (Clickworkers).
-Help Cornell University collect data on urban birds (Celebrate Urban Birds).

Apparently the first app won’t be out until mid- to late 2009. Watch this space.

Honest Merchants of Death

Unfortunately (and much to Conor’s consternation) I’ve never published the article I’ve had rattling around for almost a year now on gas-station economics. That means I can’t link to it now to defend the proposed DC subsidy for gas stations, which may not ultimately be a sensible idea but makes more sense when you look at how most urban gas stations actually make money. (I don’t know from DC gas stations in particular, but I’m assuming they follow these patterns.)

1) Selling gas. Franchisees buy gas from their parent companies, with gasoline tax already built into the cost, and generally sell it at a standard markup (say, 8 cents on the gallon). So owners aren’t responsible for high gas prices, but they feel the pinch anyway. Furthermore, when customers buy gas with their credit cards, that profit is further eroded by credit-card fees. These combine a per-transaction charge with a smaller per-gallon rate, meaning purchases have to exceed a certain quantity to be profitable for the gas station (rather than having profit eaten by the transaction cost). This threshold is fairly low — 15 to 20 dollars — but if gas is expensive, or money is tight, proprietors are far less likely to make money on the sale. Any increase in gas taxes, of course, pinches profits further.

2) Selling tobacco. Minimum prices are mandated by the government through taxes, and rose significantly this year when the State Children’s Health Insurance Program was authorized. But while most customers will buy tobacco somewhere regardless of price, there are a lot of somewheres, not all of which are locally-owned gas stations. The margin between minimum price and the highest competitive price dwindles, and so do profits.

3) Selling lottery tickets. Hugely popular in urban areas, but prices are set by the government (in DC’s case, the District of Columbia Lottery and Charitable Games Control Board), so profit margins can’t be adjusted to compensate for loss in other areas.

4) Selling food. High profit margins, low sales. (And continued public-health awareness campaigns certainly don’t increase the market for pork rinds and Mountain Dew.)

Of course, the reason these markets are so tightly regulated is to inhibit demand for these products, which generally cause social harm; it’s possible to say that a gas station’s profits rely on feeding the addictions of its customers. But franchise owners aren’t merchants of death; plenty of them are naturalized or first-generation immigrants with a little bit of entrepreneurial capital and a lot of chutzpah, attracted to a business that used to be a lot more profitable than it is. They don’t necessarily delight in enabling addiction. I’ve seen one employee chide his regular customers for their smoking habits as he rang them up. (I know that’s anecdotal, but I don’t see any evidence at all being forwarded that gas station proprietors deserve to be indirectly penalized for the sinfulness of their wares.) If a gas-station subsidy makes sense — and I’m still not sure it does, mind you — it’s because it counteracts the penalties government is already exacting on people who don’t really deserve the punishment.

Making the World Safe for Banality

Scott Payne has a piece on “glocalism” (the academy’s and my term, not his) that you should really read all of, but on his way to some wonderful (non-curmudgeony!) insights and injunctions he stumbles into an all too typical curmudgeon trope. To wit:

…a meaningful exchange and cultivation of community via platforms like Facebook and Twitter seems to the experiential exception, not the rule. More often than not, the kind of back and forth in which one engages when one these sites is a trade of surfaces and vapidity. As such, many folks grappling with questions about the influence of technology on the way we live are inclined to write these platforms off as nothing but fads…

I think this is trivially true: a lot of people post extremely boring things on Facebook. (Matt Labash has documented this in excruciating detail.) But I wonder what Payne and true curmudgeons like Labash think goes on in old-fashioned, presence-based communities. In my experience, neighborhoods and other communities that produce “rootedness” are overwhelmingly banal places, filled with small talk, gossip and all the other tokens of exchange that perpetuate relationships between members. “Rootedness” is only desirable because it teaches that these things are valuable, that there is wisdom in the everyday, that it’s possible to find fulfillment without spending one’s life wandering the globe searching for it. Why should a Facebook page be so much less banal than a church picnic or a block party?

Of course, man does not live by block parties alone. The relationship of governor to governed can’t be nearly as easily maintained via Twitter, as Ezra Klein noted the other day:

It’s intimacy without communication. (Senator Claire) McCaskill doesn’t actually say anything in 140 characters or less. The illusion of transparency comes because in everyday life, we only hear about the dinner plans of people we actually have a relationship with. What’s useful about intimacy, however, isn’t the exchange of trivia but the access to different perspectives. And I’d really like to hear her perspective! It would be rather nice if senators and congressmen routinely wrote posts explaining their thinking on major issues. A public service, even. Instead, they’ve all embraced Twitter.

I’d clarify that Twitter’s inability to accommodate this type of communication doesn’t signal that meaningful communication is impossible via Twitter, period. (“She said yes,” “I love you,” “Trying to forgive more,” “What boundaries have you tested today?”—all fit easily within 140 characters.) The other problem with the Congressional Twitter craze is that they’re mistaking their audience for their constituents. At the end of the day, the people who need to feel they know the “real you” are the ones registered to vote in your district or state. Twitter may help you build media cred to a certain extent, but intimacy matters less with the media (who will ultimately come to the same conclusions Klein has) than with the voters.

This is only a problem until congressional districts are drawn based on membership in particular social-networking sites, of course.

Don't Kiss Me

Here’s something I really don’t understand:

I do not have a drop of Irish blood in my body. (In fact, a few of my ancestors were Northern Irish Protestants, though that’s about all I know of them.) In spite of this, I am expected to spend Ireland’s national holiday dressed as if I were a member of the Irish nation. If I fail to do this, I get pinched by fellow non-Irishmen. What’s a nice Jewish girl to do?

Most people, of course, would say I’ve made a logical error in the third sentence. In America, St. Patrick’s Day isn’t just for the Irish; it’s for the Irish and those who love them, at least enough to remember what day it is when they get dressed in the morning. It’s some type of pluralist solidarity, apparently, to let our rivers and taps flow green, generous in appreciation for someone else’s motherland.

It’s hardly controversial to say that this “appreciation” lacks substance, that the Irishness being celebrated on St. Patrick’s Day — alcohol! leprechauns! the Dropkick Murphys! — is more kitsch than culture, that no one has ever learned what it is to be Irish or Irish-American while on a Guinness-sponsored pub crawl. This doesn’t embrace Irish culture, it hollows it. Maybe it was inevitable after two hundred or so years of significant Irish presence in the States; assimilation is the product of demographic macroprocesses as well as individual decisions, making it hard to understand properly and harder to reverse. But it’s also a response to a particular strand of “multicultural” pluralism, which seeks to eliminate intercultural border skirmishes by reducing barriers to entry as much as possible, stretching a culture until everyone can fit inside. (Helen wrote about this almost exactly a year ago, though the St. Patrick’s Day connection didn’t seem to occur to her — perhaps because of her affection for the Boston Irish.) When so much has been whittled away in the interests of inclusion, the question is no longer “what is lost?” then “what could possibly remain?”

The answer, it seems, is binge drinking. On St. Patrick’s Day, “Kiss Me I’m Irish” slurs into “Kiss Me I’m Shitfaced” by the end of the night; Mardi Gras’ rich carnival has become a massive frat party; and while Americans may not know that Cinco de Mayo isn’t actually the “Mexican Fourth of July,” they can count to “one tequila, two tequila, three tequila, floor.”

For a round or two, this is a sign of legitimate triumph. In Ireland, the conflict between Unionists and Nationalists may (or may not) be heating up again, but here in America we’ve come so far that no one even knows what a Black and Tan really is, and Catholics and Protestants are urged to forget old rivalries and lay Bushmills and Jameson side-by-side on their shelves. At the end of history there is nothing to do but sit at the bar and reminisce about how crazy the good old days were. But the self-consciously excessive drinking that characterizes these holidays turns them into something much darker and more harmful than that. It’s one thing to risk a hangover tomorrow for a little fun tonight, but it’s quite another to turn the act of drinking itself violent, quaffing Black and Tans, Irish Car Bombs, Hurricanes, Hand Grenades. We’ve eliminated violence to outsiders from our holidays. We’ve replaced it with violence to ourselves.

On the Power of Explanation

From the Department of Interesting Dovetails:

-Survey data shows that the number of Americans identifying themselves as “Christian” has dropped from 86% to 76% since 1990, with the rise in self-identified evangelicals unable to compensate for the decline in “mainline” Protestantism. Meanwhile, those identifying with “no religion” have climbed from 8% to 15% over that time (h/t Michelle Cottle). Researcher Mark Silk’s explanation:

“In the 1990s, it really sunk in on the American public generally that there was a long-lasting ‘religious right’ connected to a political party, and that turned a lot of people the other way…In an earlier time, people who would have been content to say, ‘Well, I’m some kind of a Protestant,’ now say ‘Hell no, I won’t go.’”

-Meanwhile, Tad McIlwraith notices that students in his Introduction to Religion class are having difficulty understanding syncretism, and hypothesizes:

I wonder if the difficulty in conceiving of these possibilities is the result of media coverage of religious extremism or fundamentalism which says something like ‘You are a Christian and THEY are not’. In essence, the questions suggest, being Christian (or whatever) is only possible in the absence of other beliefs.

Unfortunately, it’s difficult to establish what evidence Silk and McIlwraith have for their claims, though it’s intriguing enough that they reached similar conclusions from such disparate phenomena. Assuming they’re (even partially) correct, though, this concept of an “absolutist” Christianity needs to be more fully teased out, in particular the difference between belief and practice.

I’m not sure that media coverage of fundamentalist Christianity would be enough per se to persuade mainline Protestants that they’re not religious, or students that religion is naturally exclusive; after all, there will always be people in a given congregation who are “more religious than” everyone around them. Instead, perhaps it’s a qualitative difference: because media coverage of evangelical Christianity so closely hews to particular political controversies, evangelism is presented not as religious practice but as a set of explanations and justifications for positions on the issues of the day. In other words, it’s seen as a totalizing worldview. Mainliners who suspect their beliefs deviate from the accepted line could be declining to call themselves “Christian” because they don’t see Christianity as an explanation for everything, and therefore suspect they don’t “deserve” the label. They may continue to go to church, or they may not; the distinction is one of belief.

Such people are, of course, probably more likely to stop attending church. That’s because contemporary Western culture tends to stigmatize participation in a religious community that’s not accompanied by a profession of (roughly proportional) faith, calling it hypocrisy. Part of this is likely due to the destigmatization of “those of no faith,” a phenomenon Silk notes. But it’s a shame nonetheless, as it ignores the very real benefits religious practice provides even to syncretists, skeptics and those who are merely insufficiently dogmatic.

Focusing on explanatory power also provides insight into another of McIlwraith’s observations about his students:

More than usual, some of my students are interested in grand theories that explain everything (most things?). Evolution (ie adaptation to specific environments) is popular as an explanation for cultural difference…Is this the ‘Jared Diamond Effect’ where people gravitate to seemingly tidy explanations that cover every possibility? Why are big explanations more appealing than presentations of local nuance?

I think Diamond, who uses Darwinian evolution mostly as a metaphor, has been successful because of the enduring interest in evolution “as an explanation;” Steven Pinker might be a better avatar. The students McIlwraith is teaching have come from a high-school science education that simultaneously preached evolutionary theory as dogma (in most cases) and expressed excitement at its unexplored frontiers, which promise to link the full range of human tendencies and behaviors to textbook evolutionary principles. In fact, this is one of the few parts of the standard high-school curriculum that doesn’t have to fight to assert its “relevance” to prove it’s more than mindless memorization: evolution is with us every minute of every day! It’s the comprehensive explanatory power of evolutionary theory that’s elevated it to such a reverent position among secularists, even those not otherwise of a deterministic bent. (Of course, current research indicates that understanding “local nuance” is necessary to make evolutionary explanations mean anything—a point Pinker articulated quite well here —but I haven’t seen that percolate into the popular narrative yet.)

So is it any wonder that McIlwraith’s students, armed with only one theory that has comparable explanatory power to religion, should expect him to present them with another one in its place if his class challenges their assumptions? And that, if it fails to do so, they will see no reason to abandon the theory they have, which equips them with more “relevant” understanding without having to memorize all the seemingly trivial facts?

Beyond the "Social Network"

Conor’s analysis of the rise of Facebook is right as far as it goes, I think — historically, at least — but it comes to the wrong conclusion. Exclusivity is hardly an intrinsic good in social networking. Of the dozens upon dozens of invite-only social networking sites I’ve heard about, DC’s Late Night Shots is the only one that seems to have met with any success — where “success” is defined by an expose and an upcoming reality series, that is (hardly measures of respectability). The reason that Facebook’s relative exclusivity made it a game-changing site was because Facebook understood the real appeal of social networking as it existed at the time.

At this point I should clarify that the term “social-networking site” is misleading, because it assumes that the site’s purpose is to establish connections between users. Logically, though, this is actually step 2. Step 1 is the necessary prerequisite: creating a user profile. Connections aren’t established between people; they’re between virtual representations, created — performed, even — by users themselves. This sounds a lot more complex than it is. Anyone in the generation that uses social-networking sites most heavily (in which I include both myself and Conor) has been bombarded for years by PSAs about identity theft and cyber-molestation, not to mention Gawker-ready anecdotes of the “incriminating Facebook photo sinks would-be banker’s job application” variety. Is it any surprise that we’ve become compulsive about the face we present to the world?

The fundamental insight of Facebook was in discovering that most people don’t want to perform for an infinite audience. As with MySpace, any Facebook user can add any other user as a friend; the difference is who can see that user’s profile, and how much. The network-based setup promoted a certain set of norms, which, despite a massive influx of users in recent years and vastly more sophisticated privacy options, most users continue to follow: people outside your networks shouldn’t be able to see your profile; friends should be able to see most or all of your profile; you shouldn’t add anyone you haven’t met in real life; etc. These norms help users define the audiences to whom their profiles are designed to appeal.

Five years ago, a site that toggled easily between online and real-world relationships was a safe space in a Web that still seemed anonymous and impersonal, yet terrifyingly omnipotent, to “average people.” But the Internet of 2009 isn’t identical to the Internet of 2004. As spurious as much of the “Web 2.0” hype might be (and yes, of course that Time magazine cover was absurd), the fact of the matter is that the act of presenting yourself online and generating content is now part of the typical user experience. So the challenge has shifted from Step 1, the user’s node in the network, to Step 3 — in particular, how those connections might be used to filter the vast amount of content everyone’s producing.

Facebook has tried to solve this by filling its News Feed with notifications from third-party apps, but this is adding more content, not filtering what’s there. Meanwhile, the “hot” tools — Twitter, Tumblr, even the “share” function on Google Reader — leverage connections to allow users to flag interesting content for each other. Just like the norms of Facebook profiles, which encouraged people to use the site as an interface between the Internet and the real world, Twitter has unofficial codes of etiquette that encourage users to share links with each other and engage each other in direct conversation. It’s an interface between an individual’s personal network and the Internet itself: other Twitter users, sites, blogs and countless other sources of content. It’s as much an aggregator as a social-networking site as it’s commonly understood.

The nature of Twitter doesn’t directly address Conor’s concern for separating “‘Tweets’ one actually wants to get from ‘Tweets’ one doesn’t.” What it’s done is promote norms that have made that easier. For one thing, Twitter etiquette doesn’t compel users to reciprocate when people follow them, which MySpace does — and which Facebook requires for “friendship” to be established. This makes it harder for a user to gain “prestige” merely by establishing connections — he has to generate content interesting enough for people to want to follow him.

For another, I’ve noticed that “unfollowing” someone on Twitter is much less stigmatized than “unfriending” them on Facebook. A Facebook friendship is codifying a connection, the culminating act of the site. As such, most Facebook profiles are designed as much for people who aren’t friends as people who are: nonfriends see a user’s profile first, while friends see her wall. Following someone on Twitter, on the other hand, is tantamount to subscribing to their content: an introductory step. Unfollowing, by extension, isn’t a broken friendship, merely a cancelled subscription. So a user can continue to refine both his intake streams and his audience, which is defined by nothing more than the people who care about what he has to say.

This makes Twitter often feel more intimate than Facebook, in fact — the size of the audience may vary, but it’s always a friendly one. Maybe it goes a little too far in this respect, preventing followers from pushing back against users who mix interesting and uninteresting content. But as the site continues to develop, I wouldn’t be surprised if users deliberately changed the way they used Twitter to implement norms that favored consistently compelling Tweets. This is the other thing it’s useful to remember when talking about this kind of site: it’s absurd to talk about how the site “is used” as if individual users have no agency. The question is how individuals use the site, and which kinds of use the company running the site facilitates.

Wonk Decency

I understand why critics of Bush-era interventionism, the military-industrial complex, etc. might be skeptical that anyone engaging specifically in “defense policy” would be altruistic in their motivations, as opposed to “foreign policy” specialists or other breeds of wonk. But sometimes it gets oddly paranoid. So when Andrew Exum sums up counterinsurgency theory in a sentence (though you should read the whole post) by saying “No one who really understands COIN wants to do it,” Matt Yglesias counters with the old ‘hammer theory’ :

…active engagement in counterinsurgency operations tends to boost demand for counterinsurgency experts while a foreign policy that aimed to avoid such scenarios might reach the conclusion that it can afford to simply ignore the subject. Thus you could see a certain structural bias in COIN circles toward wanting to see COIN-needed situations lurking under every rock.

The review that inspired Exum’s post makes a similar insinuation, describing at length the career trajectories of those to whom “the Long War has been good.” But I think that both of these attitudes fundamentally misunderstand the cognitive dissonance Exum’s trying to convey. It’s not that COIN experts understand intellectually that good news for them is bad news for other people somewhere far away, so they’re trained to nod gravely and intone “But it must be done” at the end of briefings to conceal their inner joy at getting more work. Like specialists in any other policy area, plenty of COIN theorists genuinely care about the problem they’re trying to solve — in this case, restoring order to violence-ravaged neighborhoods — and therefore they’ve acquired the expertise to help solve it. Sure, some of them may also harbor ambition, but ambition and compassion can go hand in hand. (This is one of the premises for republicanism, but I think people who make careers in politics and policy often forget it, which is sad. One has to wonder why they got into the business themselves.)

Part of the problem comes from the tendency to divide foreign-policy thinkers into ideological camps rather than specialties; certainly COIN operates from a particular set of beliefs about goals, but it would be ridiculous to mistake those beliefs for a Foreign Policy Theory of Everything. (This is actually the point of Exum’s post.) So it might be more constructive to analogize it to domestic policy, which suffers less from the confusion of ideology and content. There are plenty of people who have devoted their careers to studying health care, entitlements, single parenting, or any other “crisis” in domestic affairs, for example. In some cases, they tend to share a particular notion of what solutions should be taken. It would be weird to scrutinize them for attempts to “export” these tactics to other issues merely because of their initial success. Why is it different for experts who happen to study things with guns?

The implication is either that COIN theorists don’t know their own field well enough to understand when a situation falls beyond it, or that people who specialize in Bad Situations will always wind up succumbing to self-interest to perpetuate or invent circumstances that will keep them in demand. That’s just creepy, regardless of what kind of expert you’re talking about.

The Proper Cultivation of the Muck-Raked Garden

Conor’s $75K newspaper rescue-mission thought experiment is spawning a bunch of awesome comments, and I hope that discussion continues to develop. As if on cue, today the Center for Public Integrity (which is a national nonprofit dedicated to the sort of investigative work Conor’s trying to promote) announced the launch of a new feature on their blog which would compile “often-overlooked” investigative reports. (Unfortunately, they don’t seem to have a separate RSS feed set up for it yet, but if you’re so inclined you should bookmark the main blog — called, ironically, The Paper Trail.)

CPI isn’t the only nonprofit engaging in investigative journalism, plus or minus the journalism. The Project on Government Oversight does similar work, and ProPublica was formed a few years ago with the explicit mission of filling the investigative gap left by newspaper cuts. (I’m sure there are others of which I’m unaware, and I’d love to hear about them.)

All of these focus on the federal government, meaning that they suffer from the watchdog equivalent of the Times fallacy. But maybe they could complement the network Conor would be building. I’m imagining a system where up-and-coming muckrakers get their start in Washington working for a national watchdog group, then fan out from there to become the big fish in a lot of smaller investigative ponds. This might seem like a hard sell to a would-be Woodstein, but it’s worth considering that a good local investigative reporter could get more consistent attention, and more results, than a good national one. There’s just so much more muck to rake in DC, and it seems so much harder to convince anyone that any one story is particularly slimy.

The difference is that DC had Woodstein. It’s hard for me to think of any local muckrakers with that kind of stature. (Then again, I don’t pretend to be up on my localist newspaper traditions…) The only local newspapermen in pop culture I can think of are in comic books. Contemporary pop culture has switched to television news, where correspondents are at best slightly hapless and at worst, well, you know.

Come to think of it, local media generally gets portrayed as some pale, barely-competent imitation of national media, especially if the locality in question isn’t a major urban area. I’m sure some of that is the smugness of national “network types” et al., who have the power to create that sort of image, but it’s something that has to be dealt with if we’re trying to determine the real community benefits of local journalism.

Incidentally, the California Civic Journalism Project (which needs a better name) may be my second favorite of Conor’s pipe-dream projects, after the Wood Quarterly Journal. Much of TAS has been burned by recent experiences with venture capital, but if any wealthy reader wants to alleviate his economic-crisis survivor guilt, I strongly suggest endowing a Friedersdorf Grant for Media Awesomeness.

Leave it to a mustachioed NYT columnist...

My feelings toward Thomas Friedman are no secret, but I’m disappointed Alex Tabarrok (via Andrew) quoted this passage from Tuesday’s column without noting how problematic it was:

Leave it to a brainy Indian to come up with the cheapest and surest way to stimulate our economy: immigration.

“All you need to do is grant visas to two million Indians, Chinese and Koreans,” said Shekhar Gupta, editor of The Indian Express newspaper. “We will buy up all the subprime homes. We will work 18 hours a day to pay for them. We will immediately improve your savings rate — no Indian bank today has more than 2 percent nonperforming loans because not paying your mortgage is considered shameful here….”

Friedman explains the quote is tongue-in-cheek. I’d like to believe the “brainy Indian” lede is tongue-in-cheek as well, except that it seems entirely in keeping with the wide-eyed exoticism with which Friedman usually treats Indian entrepreneurs. Regardless of his intentions, or those of his source, the piece takes on odd connotations.

In a best-case scenario, Friedman’s thesis — that America should welcome educated elites from the “developing world” rather than forcing them to compete with the U.S. economically — is bizarrely reverse-engineered. Indigenous elites don’t spring out of nowhere; it seems likely that Shekhar Gupta’s parents would have been as much an asset to America as he would be, but were impeded by the same regime. Is Friedman arguing that we should never have allowed such elites to develop to begin with, and used an open-door policy to maintain a monopoly on intellectual capital? Or should we use the world’s entrepreneurs as our recession cavalry?

The bigger problem is that a lot of Americans really do believe that natives of East and South Asia who come to the United States are uniquely skilled and hardworking in a way that natives of Mexico or Guatemala who come to the United States aren’t. The United States has a long history of distinguishing “good” immigrants from “bad” immigrants: Western Europeans from “radical” Eastern and Southern Europeans, asylees from economic migrants. At the moment, Mexican immigrants appear to be saddled in popular culture with the assumptions that they a) have entered illegally and b) are less intelligent or hardworking than their (particularly Asian) peers. Friedman’s invocation of a “culture” that requires fiscal responsibility helps reinforce the stereotype that an immigrant family from another region wouldn’t work 18 hours a day to pay off a mortgage. His complete omission of Latin America, when Mexico alone sent twice as many legal immigrants to the U.S. as China did from 2005-07, feeds into the assumption that such a family wouldn’t be able to get the mortgage to begin with.

It’s true that the current wave of migration from Asia is more heavily middle-class than the one from Latin America. But Friedman’s own argument implies that this discrepancy is due more to past immigration policy than some inherent cultural failing. I don’t yet know how I feel about the actual “buy a house, get a visa” policy that Tabarrok has so neatly (and compellingly) pulled out, but there’s no reason why a debate over this type of “immigration solution” should happen in such demographically different terms from the debate over the “immigration problem.”

TJ and T.J.

TJ Sullivan, independent journalist and LA Observed blogger, has a modest proposal for saving journalism and by extension “American Democracy” (his caps): Take to the barricades firewalls. He wants all newspapers and magazines to shut down their Web content for a week and force Americans to pick up the dead-tree copies instead.

His proposed start date for the shutdown is July 4th, which should indicate how steeped his manifesto is in the defense-of-democracy argument. To bolster his case he uses a passage from Thomas Jefferson’s personal correspondence as a recurring motif. (Hagiography of the Founding Fathers sometimes seems to be the only acceptable genre of patriotism among Serious People.) The gist:

Jefferson went on to say that, without newspapers, he feared the American public would stop paying attention to their government. Once that happened it was only a matter of time before Jefferson, the Congress, and the whole of the American government turned into a pack of wolves preying upon sheep.

The use of Jefferson to drive the point home — like a celebrity endorsement — makes sense as far as it goes; Jefferson and the rest of the Founding Fathers were clearly very concerned that the American public remain informed, and saw newspapers as the best way to make that happen. They cared so deeply, in fact, that they passed legislation to charge newspapers unusually low postal rates: one cent to deliver each copy to a subscriber, and free delivery for copies being sent to other papers, or “exchanges.”

The exchanges were the important part, because papers in those days gathered content primarily by selecting articles that had already run in other towns and reprinting them. For free. (There weren’t even subscription charges for exchanges, because they were generally mutual. One could probably argue that the news-gathering relationship between blogs and newspapers is similarly mutual, of course.)

As a result, citizens were able to learn about what was going on in the rest of the country; as they learned more, they discussed more; as they discussed more, the people they were talking to learned more. I understand concerns about the fate of investigative journalism, but the reason journalism is so important to democracy isn’t primarily to excavate information, but to circulate it.

Sullivan’s use of the Founding Fathers’ passion for newspapers to argue for exactly the same sort of “discomfort” they deliberately avoided is ironic, but it’s typical. The press is only necessary to democracy insofar as it produces an informed populace. Once the “curmudgeons” (to crib a term from Jay Rosen) start thinking of journalism as something that comes on paper, they’re barking up the wrong dead tree.

I got the details on the Postoffice Act of 1792 from American Journalism, by Frank Luther Mott.